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Abstract
We show that the standard argument according to which supply function
equilibria rank intermediate between Bertrand and Cournot equilibria may
be reversed. We prove this result within a static oligopolistic game in which
both supply function competition and Cournot competition yield a unique
Nash equilibrium, whereas price setting yields a continuum of Nash equi-
libria. There are parameter regions in which Bertrand prots are higher
than Cournot ones, with the latter being higher than in the supply function
equilibrium. Such reversal of the typical ranking occurs when price-setting
mimics collusion. We then show that the reversal in prots is responsible for
a reversal in the welfare performance of the industry.
JEL Codes: D43, L13
Keywords: convex costs; supply function; price competition; quantity
competition
1 Introduction
There is little doubt about Cournot and Bertrand models being considered
the most popular stylised representations of market games. However, there
are markets characterised by sellers (and/or buyers) competing in supply
(and/or demand) schedules: wholesale electricity, for instance, well ts such
a setting in many countries.1 Despite the by now huge literature, it is still
an open question whether the price or quantity competition model is the
better t for di¤erent oligopolistic markets, and the supply function model
appears to be an attractive model(Vives, 2011, pp. 1919-20).
When modelling oligopolistic industries, an interesting question deals
with ranking equilibria associated to di¤erent types of market competition.
More precisely, one is likely interested in detecting and comparing predic-
tions stemming - coeteris paribus - from equilibria in di¤erent strategies. If
we conne the attention to Nash equilibria under the three aforementioned
types of oligopolistic competition (quantities, prices, supply functions), since
Klemperer and Meyer (1989) it has been claimed that the supply function
equilibrium ranks intermediate between Bertrand and Cournot ones. Within
static models of industries populated by identical rms producing homoge-
neous output, prots have been shown higher under quantity competition
than under supply function competition, and higher in the latter setting
than under Bertrand rules.
In this paper, we challenge such conclusion within a simple oligopoly
game where Bertrand competition yields a continuum of Nash equilibria. We
show that there exist parameter regions in which Bertrand prots are higher
than Cournot ones, which in turn are higher than in the supply function
equilibrium. the reversal in prot ranking drives a reversal in the standard
welfare ranking. Intuitively, the reversals occur the higher the marginal cost
and larger the departure from marginal cost pricing in the Bertrand game.
In such a parameter constellation price-setting mimics collusive behaviour.
1See Klemperer and Meyer (1989) for other examples, and Grossman (1981). An ex-
cellent introduction to supply function equilibria is Vives (1999, ch. 7).
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises
the related literature and locates our contribution in the research eld. Sec-
tion 3 presents the setup and the equilibria generated by the three di¤erent
types of competition. Section 4 compares equilibrium prots and section 5
compares equilibrium levels of social welfare. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
We may group the contributions closest to ours into three streams. The rst
one, starting from the mid 1980s, focusses on the comparison between the
properties of Nash equilibria under price- and quantity-setting behaviour un-
der di¤erent specication of technologies, demand and symmetry (or the lack
thereof) across rms. A selection of the most quoted papers includes Singh
and Vives (1984), Cheng (1985), Vives (1985), Okuguchi (1987), Qiu (1997),
Häckner (2000), Zanchettin (2006). The focus of this discussion is about
the relative performance of prices vs quantities in terms of protability and
social welfare, and the pivotal issue is the degree of symmetry across rms,
especially in terms of productive technology, demand level and their interplay
with product di¤erentiation. The usual conclusion whereby Bertrand is less
protable and more e¢ cient than Cournot can ip over in presence of a suf-
ciently high degree of cost and demand asymmetry (see Zanchettin, 2006).2
The entire discussion taking place in this subset of the literature considers
models delivering unique equilibria in the relevant strategic variable.
The second stream of literature has been pioneered by Dastidar (1995)
who has proved the existence of a continuum of pure-strategy equilibrium
prices in an homogeneous oligopoly. The properties of Bertrand-Nash equi-
libria have been investigated also by Dastidar (1997, 2011) under di¤erent
specications of the cost functions, under the assumption of product homo-
geneity. The interesting paper by Saporiti and Coloma (2010) presents new
2An analogous reversal obtains in dynamic games, for instance when resource extraction
enters the picture, as in Colombo and Labrecciosa (2015).
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results and an extremely helpful taxonomy of the most recent contributions
on price competition. The focus of this portion of the literature is about the
uniqueness of pure (or mixed) strategy equilibrium price depending on the
specication of the cost function, also including xed components.
Finally, there is a smaller group of papers concerned with competition
in supply functions. This literature was initiated by Grossman (1981) and
especially Klemperer and Meyer (1989), who consider an oligopolistic game
with demand uncertainty. More recent papers include Delgado and Moreno
(2004) and Ciarreta and Gutierrez-Hita (2006), to which we shall refer again
later.
Our contribution crosses the aforementioned streams as we compare Bertrand,
Cournot and supply functions equilibria in an industry where price-setting
yields a continuum of Bertrand equilibria in pure strategies, the good is
homogeneous, all rms are endowed with the same technology displaying
increasing variable costs and no xed ones.
3 Setup and the three games
Here we describe an industry by means of assumptions that make tractable a
model otherwise very complex, especially as for then case in which strategies
are functions (the supply function case). Moreover, our functional specica-
tion of demand and technology will allow us a complete comparison of the
three types of market games equilibria.
Consider a market supplied by a set N = 1; 2; 3; :::; n of identical rms
producing a homogeneous good whose direct demand function isQ = max f0; 1  pg ;
where Q = ni=1qi is aggregate output, qi is rm is output and p is price.
Production takes place at decreasing returns to scale, and technology, shared
by all rms, is summarised by the strictly convex cost function Ci = cq2i =2.
Accordingly, the prot function of rm i is
i =

p  cqi
2

qi =

1  qi  Q i   cqi
2

qi (1)
where Q i = j 6=iqj.
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Firms play simultaneously a non-cooperative one-shot game under com-
plete, symmetric and imperfect information. The solution concept is the
Nash equilibrium.
 Under Cournot competition, the relevant rst order condition (FOC)
for rm i is the following:
@i
@qi
= 1  2qi  Q i   cqi = 0 (2)
and the symmetry condition (qj = qi = q for all i and j) yields the
unique Cournot-Nash individual equilibrium output and price
qCN =
1
n+ 1 + c
; pCN =
1 + c
n+ 1 + c
(3)
The resulting equilibrium prots are
CN =
2 + c
2 (n+ 1 + c)2
(4)
 In modelling the price-setting game, we follow Dastidar (1995), where
it is shown that, if costs are strictly convex in output levels and de-
mand is decreasing in price, Bertrand competition yields a continuum
of Nash equilibria when rms are identical. More precisely, the Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies involves all rms setting the same price
p 2 [pavc; pu] : At the lower bound pavc; equilibrium price equals aver-
age variable costs, so that rms would be indi¤erent between producing
or not. At the upper bound pu; the equilibrium price is such that rms
would be indi¤erent between playing pu or marginally undercutting it
in order to serve the entire market demand.
Without delving further into the details of the derivation of the continuum
of price equilibria (see Dastidar, 1995, pp. 27-28; and Gori et al. 2014, pp.
373-75), the spectrum of equilibrium prices is identied by
pBN =
c
c+ 2 (n  ) (5)
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where  is a non-negative parameter whose range, to be specied below,
determines the continuum of equilibrium prices. The associated individual
output is
qBN =
2 (n  )
n [c+ 2 (n  )] (6)
and prots are
BN =
2c (n  )
n2 [c+ 2 (n  )]2 : (7)
As far as parameter  is concerned, it is worth noting that:
1. in  = 0; the equilibrium price equals average variable cost;
2. at  = n=2; marginal cost pricing obtains;
3. if  = n2= (1 + n) ; pBN reaches the highest level above which under-
cutting takes place.
Consequently, the admissible range is  2 [0; n2= (1 + n)] : For future
reference, we dene sup := n2= (1 + n) :
The following result will become useful in the remainder:
Lemma 1 pBN > pCN for all  > pBC  n (2 + c) = [2 (1 + c)] ; with pBC 2
(n=2; n2= (n+ 1)] for all c  2= (n  1).
Proof. The di¤erence between the two equilibrium prices is
pBN   pCN = 2 (1 + c)  n (2 + c)
(n+ 1 + c) [2 (n  ) + c] (8)
where the denominator is positive since   sup < n. Hence, the sign of (8)
is the sign of the expression appearing at the numerator, which is positive
for all  > n (2 + c) = [2 (1 + c)]  pBC . It is then easily ascertained that
pBC 2 (n=2; n2= (n+ 1)] for all c  2= (n  1).
The interpretation of the above Lemma is that Bertrand equilibrium price
exceeds the Cournot one in the admissible range of  when the cost function is
su¢ ciently steep and  is such that the Bertrand-Nash price departs enough
from marginal cost.
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 In modelling supply function competition, we adopt the same approach
used by Ciarreta and Gutierrez-Hita (2006), which o¤ers a simple tool
for solving the supply function game originally formulated by Klem-
perer and Meyer (1989). Given the linear-quadratic form of the prot
function (1), one may formulate the conjecture that supply functions
are linear in price. Therefore, we dene the supply function of rm i
as si = ip; i > 0. The market clearing price solves
1  p =
nX
i=1
si (9)
from which we have
p =
1
1 +
Pn
i=1 i
(10)
Hence, we may rewrite the individual prot function as follows:
i =
i
(1 +
Pn
i=1 i)
2

1  ci
2

(11)
This amounts to saying that, if rms compete in supply functions, their
set of strategic variables is the vector of is, one for each rm. The
FOC is:
@i
@i
=
1 +
P
j 6=i j   i
h
1 + c

1 +
P
j 6=i j
i
(1 +
Pn
i=1 i)
3 = 0 (12)
Imposing symmetry across rms, as the second order condition is met,
the unique equilibrium strategy solving the above equation is
SFN =
n  2  c+
q
(n  2)2 + c (2n+ c)
2c (n  1) (13)
which is clearly positive for all admissible values of c and n. The
associated equilibrium price, individual output and prots are
pSFN =
2c (n  1)
c (n  2) + n

n  2 +
q
(n  2)2 + c (2n+ c)
 (14)
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qSFN =
n+ 2 + c 
q
(n  2)2 + c (2n+ c)
2 (2n+ c)
(15)
SFN =
2n+ (n+ c)
q
(n  2)2 + c (2n+ c)  n  c

4 (2n+ c)
(16)
with qSFN and SFN being strictly positive over the entire parameter
range.
4 Ranking equilibrium prots
In Klemperer and Meyer (1989, pp. 1258-59), it is shown that the equilib-
rium prots generated by competition in supply functions are intermediate
between those generated by Cournot and Bertrand behaviour, when the lat-
ter is restricted to marginal cost pricing.3
Proposition 2 (Klemperer and Meyer, 1984, p. 1259) CN > SFN
for all n  2.
Without repeating the full proof, it su¢ ces to note that, in our model,
the sign of CN   SFN is the sign of
(n  1)2 (2n+ c) 2c2 + 2n (n+ 2) + c (4n+ 3) (17)
as can be easily ascertained using (4) and (16); the sign of the above expres-
sion is clearly positive.
Under marginal cost pricing, it would also be true that CN > SFN >
BN for all n  2, as in Klemperer and Meyer (1989). However, here we
are dealing with a continuum of price equilibria ranging well above marginal
3A similar conclusion is reached by Delgado and Moreno (2014, Theorem 2.2), in a
model without uncertainty where supply functions are bound to be non-decreasing, de-
mand is strictly decreasing and convex, costs are non-drecreasing, convex and identical
across rms.
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cost pricing. Since Betrand-Nash equilibrium prots BN are a function of
, our strategy consists in searching for admissible intervals of  in which
BN overcomes SFN and even CN .
We start by comparing BN and CN : The expression
BN CN =   [(2 + c)n  2 (1 + c)]

n (2n+ c)2   2 (c (1 + c) + 2n (c+ n))
2n2 (n+ 1 + c)2 [c+ 2 (n  )]2
(18)
is positive for all  2 (BC1; BC2) ; with
BC1 =
(2 + c)n
2 (1 + c)
; BC2 =
n (2n+ c)2
2 [c (1 + c) + 2n (c+ n)]
(19)
Now note that
lim
c!0
BC1 = lim
c!0
BC2 = n (20)
sup > 

BC1 8 c > cBC1 =
2
n  1 (21)
and
sup > 

BC2 8 c > cBC2 =
n
 
1 +
p
4n  3
n  1 > cBC1: (22)
Since CN > SFN from Proposition 1, this immediately implies:
Proposition 3 BN > CN > SFN for all  2 (BC1;min fBC2; supg) :
The relevant region is drawn in Figure 1, in the space (c; ).
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Figure 1 BN > CN > SFN in the space (c; )
6
-

c
BC2
BC1
sup
cBC1 cBC2
BN > CN > SFN
n
We now show that the region in which BN > CN > SFN is a proper
subset of the parameter range wherein BN > SFN . To do so, we have to
compare BN and SFN . Tedious algebra is needed to verify that
BN > SFN 8 2 (BSF1;min fBSF2; supg) (23)
with
BSF1 =
n (2n+ c) [c2n+ n2 (n  2  x)  c (2  y   n (2n  x))]
2 [c2 (n2   2) + n3 (n  2  x) + nc (n (2n  x)  4)] (24)
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BSF2 =
n (2n+ c) [c2n+ n2 (n  2  x)  c (2 + y   n (2n  x))]
2 [c2 (n2   2) + n3 (n  2  x) + nc (n (2n  x)  4)] (25)
where
x :=
q
c (c+ 2n) + (n  2)2 (26)
y :=
p
2 [(n+ c) (n+ c  x)  2 (n  1)] (27)
in such a way that, indeed, BSF2 > 

BSF1 and limc!0 

BSF1 = limc!0 

BSF2 =
n: The region where BN > SFN ; identied in (23), is drawn in Figure 2.
Figure 2 BN > SFN in the space (c; )
6
-

c
BSF2
BSF1
sup
BN > SFN
n
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We may now order the critical thresholds of  appearing in Figures 1-2.
The di¤erence between BSF2 and 

BC2 is:
BSF2 BC2 =
cn (c+ 2n) y
cn (nx+ 4  2n2)  n3 (n  2  x)  c2 (n2   2) > 08 c > 0; n  2:
(28)
By the same token, one can verify that BC1 > 

BSF1 in the same space
fc; ng. This delivers Figure 3, where the set of curves fBSF1; BSF2; BC1; BC2g
are drawn.
Figure 3 Ranking equilibrium prots in the space (c; )
6
-

c
BSF2
BSF1
sup
I
II
II
III
III
n
BC2
BC1
11
In Figure 3, we identify three regions:
 Region I, where BN > CN > SFN
 Region II, where CN > BN > SFN
 Region III, where CN > SFN > BN
Region III hosts the familiar ranking seeing the supply function equilib-
rium as intermediate between Bertrand and Cournot equilibria. In Region
II, Bertrand equilibrium prots overcome those generated by supply func-
tion competition. In region I, we have a full reversal of the traditional prot
ranking.
The intuition behind the ranking in region I can be explained as fol-
lows. This region is featured by (comparatively) high values of both  and
c. Recalling Lemma 1, one may explain the chain of inequalities emerging in
region I on the basis of the inequality between pBN and pCN . When  and
c are high enough, the Bertrand-Nash price ranks rst, price-setting rms
implementing a quasi-collusive outcome.
In region I, Bertrand behaviour outperforms both Cournot and supply
function competition from the rmsstandpoint. One may then conjecture
that, for any c > cBC1; if  is larger than BC1; welfare levels rank opposite
to prots. This is indeed what we are about to show in the next section.
5 Ranking equilibrium welfare levels
Dene social welfare as SWKN = nKN + CSKN ; where K = B;C; SF and
CSKN =
 
QKN
2
=2 is consumer surplus, dened in terms of industry output
QKN = nqKN . Since the welfare level is proportional to the industry output,
for the sake of simplicity we may restrict our attention to industry outputs
across equilibria. To begin with, we compare QSFN against QCN :
sign

QSFN  QCN	 = sign f(n  1) (2n+ c)g (29)
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which is positive everywhere. Then,
QBN R QCN for all  Q (2 + c)n
2 (1 + c)
= BC1 (30)
Taken together, (29-30) imply:
Proposition 4 Take c > cBC1. As soon as rms set  > BC1; we have
QSFN > QCN > QBN : As a result, SW SFN > SWCN > SWBN :
The above Proposition has a natural explanation, in that when Bertrand
prots rank rst, this happens through an output restriction and a price
increase, which of course is detrimental to welfare.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have presented a simple linear-quadratic model of homo-
geneous oligopoly allowing a fully-edged comparative analysis of di¤erent
market games. We have shown that the standard ranking among, price,
quantity and supply function equilibria may be reversed for prots as well
as social welfare levels. The reason why equilibrium prots (welfare) may
be higher (lower) under price competition than under quantity and supply
function competition lies in rms being able to price well above marginal
cost in the Bertrand game. Such an ability stems from the convexity of
the cost function and the resulting continuum of pure-strategy equilibrium
prices. This reversal of the standard prot and welfare rankings occur when
price competition mimics collusive behaviour. Hence, the convexity of the
cost function may prevent ranking the supply function equilibrium as inter-
mediate between price and quantity equilibria.
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